Capital formation, capital rate of return and economic inequality in Middle East and North Africa by Farid, Marmar
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
6-1-2016 
Capital formation, capital rate of return and economic inequality 
in Middle East and North Africa 
Marmar Farid 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Farid, M. (2016).Capital formation, capital rate of return and economic inequality in Middle East and North 
Africa [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/262 
MLA Citation 
Farid, Marmar. Capital formation, capital rate of return and economic inequality in Middle East and North 
Africa. 2016. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/262 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
 
 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy  
 
 
 
 
CAPITAL FORMATION, CAPITAL RATE OF RETURN AND 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
 
Public Policy and Administration Department 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Public Administration 
 
 
By  
 
 
 
 
 
Marmar Mohamed Reda Farid Abdou 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spring 2016 
2 
 
The American University in Cairo 
 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy  
 
 
CAPITAL FORMATION, CAPITAL RATE OF RETURN AND 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted by  
 
Marmar Mohamed Reda Farid Abdou 
 
 
to the Department of Public Policy and Administration 
 
Spring 2016 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of  
Master of Public Administration 
has been approved by  
 
Dr. Hamid Ali __________________________________________ 
Thesis Advisor  
Affiliation _ Department of Public Policy and Administration ____ 
Date ____________________ 
 
Dr. Ghada Barsoum______________________________________ 
Thesis First Reader 
Affiliation _ Department of Public Policy and Administration ____ 
Date ____________________ 
 
Dr. Shahjahan Buhiyan___________________________________ 
Thesis Second Reader  
Affiliation _ Department of Public Policy and Administration ____ 
Date ___________________ 
 
Dr. Hamid Ali _________________________________________ 
Public Policy and Administration Department Chair          
Date ____________________ 
 
Ambassador Nabil Fahmy _______________________________ 
Dean of GAPP 
Date ____________________ 
   
3 
 
 
Acknowledgments	
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Hamid Ali for his continuous 
guidance and motivation throughout my thesis. His availability and wealth of information 
were definitely of great help to me. His patience, support and encouragement have always 
pushed me to work harder. 
I also thank the readers of my thesis, Dr. Ghada Barsoum and Dr. Shahjahan Buhiyan for 
their time, valuable comments and constructive feedback.   
I would also like to thank Professor Hamid Ali, Dr. Shahjahan Buhiyan, Dr. Moataz 
Abdel Fattah and all my professors from the Public Policy and Administartion Department 
at the American University in Cairo for all what they taught me and for being helpful and 
supportive throughout my MPA.    
My profound gratitude goes to my beloved mother and the soul of my precious father. Your 
faith in my capabilities and endless encouragement throughout my life is what pushed me to 
where I am today. No words can ever express my love and gratitude to you.  
I deeply thank my beloved daughters, Farah and Hana, for their understanding and patience 
despite their young age to support my studies. Both of them had to study independently to 
help me achieve my MPA degree. I would not have done it without your support. You beard 
so much for me to accomplish my work. 
Besides, I extend my thanks to my dear friend, Dina Adly, for sharing my frustrations during 
our studies. Without your push and encouragement I couldn't have made it. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my sisters, Shahira and Hanan and my brother, 
Saleh, for their concern and support to me during the thesis and for believing in me through 
the way. 
 
Lastly, I hope this thesis will stimulate further research and data collection in MENA. 
 
 
Marmar Farid 
	 	
4 
 
Dedication 
 
My work is dedicated to  
my precious parents 
and 
my lovely daughters  
 
	
 
 
 
   
5 
 
The American University in Cairo 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy   
Department of Public Policy and Administration 
 
CAPITAL FORMATION, CAPITAL RATE OF RETURN AND 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
 
Marmar Mohamed Reda Farid Abdou  
 
Supervised by Dr. Hamid Ali   
 
ABSTRACT  
Economic inequality is turning into one of the most pressing issues in the 21st century. The 
inequality gap between the rich and the poor raises red flags to the world's economic, social 
and political well-being. A small minority is controlling the world's economy and has the 
most influential power, which will result in more political instability and lower social 
inclusion within the world. This was witnessed by the reasons studied behind the rise of the 
Arab Spring and the turmoil in the MENA region. The literature exhibits a wealth of studies 
and ongoing debate for the reasons behind inequality among and within the countries in the 
world. However, there is a dearth in literature on MENA Region when it comes to analyzing 
the causes leading to inequality and the factors that determine its level in the region, with an 
emphasis on the effect of the capital and the rate of returns. This study analyzed panel data 
from 1963 to 2012 for MENA countries to empirically investigate the effect of the capital 
formation, rate of returns on capital, controlling for the economic growth and natural 
resources rent on economic inequality in MENA. The empirical results showed that that the 
factors used to measure the capital formation such as Gross Domestic Savings and Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation are positively related to economic inequality and hence heighten the 
inequality gap. Conversely, the factors used to measure the capital rate of returns such as the 
real interest and the deposit interest rate  are negatively related to economic inequality. When 
the deposit interest rate increases, the economic inequality decreases. Policy 
recommendations are made to develop comprehensive strategies for inclusive development 
and better wealth distribution. Revised fiscal and monetary policies to reform tax and benefits 
are needed to increase fair and redistributive effects and avoid the effect of capital and power 
accumulation.  
 
 
Keywords: Economic Inequality; Capital Rate of return; Capital formation; Economic growth 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
According to Galbraith (2013), the economic inequality debate has been going on 
since the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th and 19th century. This study further elaborates 
that the great industrialists reaped the rewards of the transition to the new manufacturing 
processes causing a spread of the monopolistic power and capitalism. This has led to 
widening the inequality gaps not only among the different countries but within each country 
depending on where that country stands from the development ladder. As a result, various 
theoretical and empirical researches in different social science disciplines were directed to 
study the factors of production and the reasons of inequality. The topic remained an 
important one for research by influential economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo 
and Karl Marx, until the two decades following World War II, when this topic turned to be 
poorly looked into after economies appeared to be growing steadily and the middle class was 
at its largest, especially in the United States.    
 
Later in 1970, and for the following thirty years, income inequality became more 
marked as it headed in the opposite direction. According to the two labor economists, 
Harrison and Bluestone (1988), the stage was characterized by changing economic conditions 
at a different pace than the change in growth caused by the globalization and the new 
technologies that replaced repetitive jobs with automated machinery and robots. This 
unparalleled change of direction was what they called the "Great U Turn" (Harrison & 
Bluestone, 1988). The trend started with the global debt crisis in Latin America and Africa, 
central and Eastern Europe, and moved on to Asia. The change in direction brought back the 
interests of the researchers from different disciplines to study and test diverse hypothesis to 
explain the causes and effects of economic inequality.  
 
Globally, inequality is turning into one of the most pressing issues in the 21st century. 
Recently, Economic inequality is the subject of debate not only for economists, but for 
societies at large. It is studied equally by economists, politicians, social activists, public 
policy officers, media people as well as sociologists. 
 
Piketty (2014) argued that the fundamental force for divergence is the usually greater 
return of capital (r) than economic growth (g), and that larger fortunes generate higher 
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returns. The study further highlighted that we live in what Piketty called "Patrimonial 
Capitalism" as a result of inherited wealth dominated by an oligarchy (Piketty, 2014, p. 534). 
The global pressing issue now is not only that the gap between the rich and the poor is 
quickly escalating, but most importantly is that the gap between the richest 1% and the rest of 
the world is widening. According to Oxfam Report (2016), pre Davos Economic Summit, 
stated that 1% now own more than the rest of the world combined and that 62 individuals 
versus 388 individuals in 2010 and 80 individuals in 2015 own as much as the poorest half of 
the world's population  (Oxfam , 2016). President Barack Obama claims that "the growing gap 
between the very wealthy and everyone else is the defining challenge of our time" (Rugaber 
& Boak, 2014). 
 
The inequality gap between the rich and the poor raises dozens of red flags to the 
world's economic, social and political well-being. A small minority is controlling the world's 
economy and has the most influential power, which will result in more political instability 
and lower social inclusion within the world. 
  
In a global survey conducted by UNDP, policy makers from around the world 
acknowledged that inequality in their countries is generally high and potentially a threat to 
long-term social and economic development (United Nations, 2016). In recent years since 
2011, the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, what has been known 
as the Arab Spring, was the biggest witness on how much threat the inequality and poor 
social conditions can pose on the stability and development of many countries in the region. 
The political unrest brought social justice and equality to the forefront. The revolution was 
not simply a struggle against the authoritarian rule of some dictators but it was mainly driven 
by the rise in economic inequality and the widening gap between the autocratic ruling 
regimes that were, or still are, governing the Middle East and the people of this region.   
 
The literature exhibits a wealth of studies and ongoing debate for the reasons behind 
inequality and the factors that influenced the level of inequality to exist among and within the 
countries in the world. However, there is a dearth in literature on MENA Region when it 
comes to analyzing the causes leading to inequality and the factors that determine its level in 
the region, with an emphasis on the effect of the capital and the rate of returns. There is a 
limitation on the availability and reliability of the data on inequality in MENA. Ali (2012) 
states that "Studying inequality in MENA countries provides an opportunity to assess factors 
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that shape the countries' level of economic well-being, which has greater public policy 
implications in terms of how society allocates its scarce resources among competing needs" 
(Ali, 2012, p. 575).  
 
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to empirically fill that research gap by addressing 
the effect of capital formation and rate of returns on the level of economic inequality in 
MENA, controlling for economic growth and natural resources rent. Those variables were 
chosen since the political unrest in the region was mainly due to economic and social reasons 
as proven by the Arab Spring's slogan: "Bread, freedom and social inclusion". The slogan 
shows how citizens of the Arab countries suffer from deteriorating living conditions in food, 
education and health. In addition to the growing gap among the different societal classes 
which led to social exclusion for the poor and middle classes. The situation escalated when 
capital accumulation of the top and richest class was exaggerated and supported by the 
corrupted autocratic rulers' power. 
 
Capital accumulation in MENA, especially the Gulf countries, mainly comes from 
their abundant natural resources of oil reserves. However, the huge dependence on oil returns 
in turn jeopardize their capital and resources when oil prices went down leading to a decline 
in their growth and a heightening for their economic inequality gap. That also affected the 
other MENA countries which have benefited from the capital and the natural resources 
available in the rich oil countries when their people have migrated and worked with higher 
salaries in the Gulf countries.  Hence, whether an oil exporter or not, countries in MENA 
region were highly affected by the volatility of the oil sector in recent years. 
According to Achcar (2013), "“rentierism” and “patrimonialism” are pivotal features 
of how capitalism operates in MENA and it is expressed by high levels of social inequality, 
low levels of investment, an informal workforce, high levels of unemployment, particularly 
among young people, and low levels of women’s participation in the labour market" (Achcar, 
2013, p. 77). The concept of a “rentier state” is a way of explaining the perseverance of the 
Arab undemocratic regimes. According to his analysis, the revenues of a “rentier state” are 
"largely generated through access to rents (such as income derived from control of natural 
resources including oil and gas reserves, or income the state derives from foreign powers by 
granting them access to strategically important locations such as land for military bases), 
rather than by appropriating some of the surplus value created in production from capitalists 
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and workers through taxation" (Achcar, 2013, p. 77). Beblawi argues that this "arrangement 
concentrates economic and political power in the hands of a tiny minority whose 
redistribution of wealth becomes the provision of “private favours through the ruler’s 
benevolence” rather than an expression of a social contract between citizens and government. 
Without the need for taxation to fund the state’s activities, citizens become “far less 
demanding in terms of political participation” and a “rentier mentality” spreads through 
society breaking the relationship between “work and reward”" (Luciani, 1990). Achcar 
(2013) adds that the idea of a “rentier state” is often combined with the concept of 
patrimonialism which he classifies as a label for “an absolute, hereditary type of autocratic 
power”, which “appropriates the state for itself”. Hence, the military and the government 
administration become the property of the ruler and owe allegiance to him alone, not to the 
state or the citizens and the ruler considers the country's economic assets as his own heritage 
which of course opens the door to deeper corruption (Achcar, 2013, p. 77). 
According to Herrala & Turk-Ariss (2016), political instability controls capital 
accumulation in MENA in the past years during which the region has suffered from political 
unrest. They further state that political instability tightens borrowing constraints and impedes 
capital accumulation, thereby adversely affecting economic growth. This reinforces that 
financial development is key to economic development in MENA, which will eventually lead 
to economic equality (Herrala & Turk-Ariss, 2016, p. 1). 
1. Objective of the study 
The objective of this study is to empirically investigate the effect of the capital formation, 
rate of return on capital, controlling for the economic growth and natural resources rent on 
economic inequality in MENA region. 
2. Research Question 
Using panel data from 1963 until 2012 for MENA countries, the research question 
addressed in this thesis is: What is the effect of capital formation and capital rate of return on 
the level of Economic inequality in MENA?  
The purpose of this thesis will be to measure the magnitude and direction of the 
relationship between inequality and capital formation and rate of return in MENA. 
13 
 
3. Conceptual Framework* 
 
 
            
 
 
 
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
* Source: Author's compilation based on analysis on analysis and discussed literature. 
 
The above conceptual framework shows the factors that lead to economic inequality in 
MENA based on the discussed literature in this study. These factors include the 
salaries/wages earned by the residents; the macroeconomic policies adopted by the 
governments; the economic growth; the natural resources rent; the gender inequality in 
education and labor; the capital formation and accumulation over the years and the rate of 
returns on capital. The latter two factors are the focus of this study and their effect on 
economic inequality is empirically tested using the said panel data in MENA. Additionally, 
the other factors of economic growth and natural resources rent are used as controlling factors 
in the analysis. 
4. Significance of the study 
This research is a contribution to the literature sparsely available in MENA to 
understand the effect of capital formation, rate of returns, economic growth and natural 
resources endowment on inequality. Thus, it will help policy makers and governments in 
formulating wealth redistributive policies and tax reforms to curtail inequality in the 
region. 
Capital rate of 
return 
Economic Inequality  
in MENA 
Macroeconomic 
factors & 
Government 
Policies 
Natural 
Resources Rent 
Economic 
Growth 
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inequality in 
education 
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5. Outline of Research 
 This thesis is made up of six chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic. Chapter two 
reviews the available literature on inequality and its relationship with return on capital 
controlling other factors such as economic growth and other social factors. Chapter three 
discusses the data used in the analysis of this research thesis and its sources. Chapter four 
discusses the methodology and the empirical model. Chapter five discussed the results 
from the empirical model used in this study. Finally, chapter six draws the overall 
conclusion from the thesis and provides some policy recommendations with regards to the 
findings discussed. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
1. Defining Economic Inequality 
Dye (2016) believes that having a society in which everyone has or owns the same 
amounts of financial and material resources and in which all the people are classified in the 
same economic class is totally un-common and almost impossible. He further elaborates that 
the common is that people have wealth and income differences, this is what in literature and 
social sciences referred to as economic inequality (Dye, 2016). 
Soubbotina and Sheram (2000) discussed that a country's per capita income is not the 
only indicator for how poor the inhabitants of this country are. They added that two countries 
might have very close Gross Domestic Product (GDP), yet poverty is clearer in one than the 
other.  They believe that the distribution of income in a country is a more important factor to 
measure the quality of life and the level of poverty of that country than its per capita income. 
Inequality happens when equal percentiles of individuals or households don't get equal 
percentage of total income. For example, the richest 20 percent (quintile) receives more than 
the poorest quintile (poorest 20%) (Soubbotina & Sheram, 2000, p. 27).  
 
According to Dye (2016), economic inequality refers to financial disparity. "Some 
may be living in abject poverty, while others live in extreme luxury...The financial disparity 
is not only among the different classes but the top class has significantly more than each of 
the other classes, especially the lowest." (Dye, 2016) 
 
 The American President Andrew Jackson once said:  
"We should measure the health of our society not at its apex, but at its base." cited in 
(Era, Kochhar, Ricka, Suphaphiphat, & Tsounta, 2015).  
 
There are several ways used by economists to measure income inequality in a country 
or compare it to other countries. Amongst those ways is the Gini Index which is calculated as 
the area between a Lorenz Curve and the absolute equality line and it is used when comparing 
among countries. The more deep a country's Lorenz Curve gets, the less equal it is. A Gini 
index of zero indicates perfect equality, while an index of one represents perfect inequality 
(Soubbotina & Sheram, 2000). However, Galbraith & Kum (2004) stated that the use of Theil 
Index as a measure of inequality is better for MENA countries due to the inconsistency of the 
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data in MENA countries. They further discussed that Theil index is part of a larger family of 
measures referred to as the General Entropy class and it has the advantage of being additive 
across different subgroups or regions in the country. Theil index avoids many of the 
difficulties inherent in the use of the income distribution measures by Deininger and the 
Squire data by providing comparable and consistent measurements across space and through 
time (Galbraith & Kum, 2004). 
2. Inequality and Economic Development   
In 1955, Simon Kuznets argues that as an economy develops, a natural cycle of 
economic inequality occurs, represented by an inverted U-shape curve called the Kuznets 
curve visualized in Figure 1 below. From the curve, one can infer that as the economy 
develops, inequality first increases, then decreases after achieving a certain level of average 
income. In early development, investment opportunities for those who already have wealth 
multiply so owners of capital can accumulate wealth. Therefore, in early development, 
inequality increases. 
Figure 1: Kuznets Curve 
In
eq
ua
lit
y 
 
Per Capita 
Income 
Source: Author's explanatory drawing 
When the economy becomes mature, there is democratization and various 
redistribution mechanisms such as social welfare programs and hence countries move back to 
a lower level of inequality. Additionally, as economies experienced growth, mass education 
provided greater opportunities which decreased the inequality and the lower income portion 
of the population gained political power to change governmental policies (Nielsen & 
Alderson, 1997, p. 15). Scandinavian countries prove Kuznets' theory as they have the 
smallest income disparities, with a Gini coefficient for disposable income of around 0.25. 
This is as opposed to the emerging economies which are more unequal than rich ones 
(Beddoes, 2012, p. 13). 
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As opposed to Kuznets, Stiglitz (1996) criticized the validity of Kuznets curve theory 
by what is called the East Asian miracle (EAM). He further explains that the EAM refers to 
the rapid economic growth of eight East Asian countries – Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia – between 1965 and 1990 where 
manufacturing and export grew quickly and powerfully. Yet simultaneously, population 
levels living in absolute poverty decreased and the benefits of rapid economic growth were 
distributed broadly among the population. So, there shouldn't be a trade off in the short run 
between economic growth and inequality (Stiglitz J. E., 1996, p. 161). 
Stiglitz (1996) argued that "the East Asian experience of an intensive and successful 
economic development process along with an immediate decrease in population inequality 
can be explained by the immediate re-investment of initial benefits into land reform 
(increasing rural productivity, income, and savings), universal education (providing greater 
equality and what Stiglitz calls an “intellectual infrastructure” for productivity), and industrial 
policies that distributed income more equally through high and increasing wages and limited 
the price increases of commodities. These factors increased the average citizen’s ability to 
consume and invest within the economy, further contributing to economic growth. The high 
rates of growth provided the resources to promote equality, which acted as a positive-
feedback loop to support the high rates of growth. The EAM defies the Kuznets curve, which 
insists growth produces inequality, and that inequality is a necessity for overall growth." 
(Stiglitz J. E., 1996, p. 157) 
On the other hand, Galor and Zeira (1993) looked differently at the relationship 
between inequality and economic growth. The model suggests that the initial level of 
inequality of income and wealth affects the future economic growth and not the other way 
around discussed above that the growth is the one affecting inequality. The model supported 
the argument that the initial distribution of wealth or income affects the aggregate economic 
growth of a country in spite of facing capital market failures. It also emphasized that to 
stabilize the economic growth, it is imperative to have and maintain a large middle class. So, 
it looked at income distribution (economic inequality) within a country as the influencing 
factor on growth and not vice versa (Galor & Zeira, 1993, p. 35). 
 
The relationship between inequality and economic growth is still on debate and 
revisited by scholars in their empirical and theoretical studies with varying results noted: 
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Forbes and Partridge support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between 
inequality and economic growth and that the increase of inequality in the short and medium 
term has a positive implication on future economic growth in rich countries (Forbes, 2000, 
pp. 869-887); (Partridge, 1997, pp. 1019-1032). As opposed to them, another found that 
inequality is negatively correlated with economic growth (De la Croix & Doepke, 2003, pp. 
1091-1113); (Clarke, 1995, pp. 403-427); (Perotti, 1993, pp. 755-776).While a third group of 
scholars concluded that there is a changing non-linear relationship between inequality and 
economic growth (Barro, 2000, pp. 5-32); (Castello-Climent, 2010, pp. 293-321); (Pagano, 
2004). Some scholars also believe that there is no relationship between inequality and 
economic growth (Lee & Roemer, 1998, pp. 217-240); (Panizza, 2002, pp. 25-41).  
Smith (2012) argued that advocates of neoliberalism state that neoliberalism often 
reduces absolute inequality, promotes a free market economy that has economic prosperity as 
its ultimate target. "Yet, numerous scholars argue that economic liberalism is itself a cause of 
inequality" (Smith, 2012). 
3. Natural Resources Abundance 
A debate is continuously going in literature to investigate if having abundant natural 
resources is a blessing or a curse. According to Sachs and Warner (1999), "The resource 
curse", or "the paradox of plenty", refers to the idea that countries with an abundance of 
natural resources, specifically non-renewable resources such as minerals and fuel, tend to 
develop less and have a slower economic growth than countries with fewer natural resources 
(Sachs & Warner, 1999, pp. 43-76). Their study further added that this could be a result of a 
decline in how competitive the other economic sectors are and the fact that the revenues from 
the natural resource sector are volatile depending on the commodity market swings 
worldwide. Adding to that these natural resources is mismanaged by the government or by 
corrupted institutions (Sachs & Warner, 1999, pp. 43-76). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies 51 countries as “resource-rich", these 
are countries which derive at least 20% of exports or 20% of fiscal revenue from 
nonrenewable natural resources." (International Monetary Fund, 2011). 29 of these countries 
are low and lower-middle-income. These 29 countries have extreme dependence on resource 
wealth for fiscal revenues, export sales, or both, low saving rates and poor growth 
performance (Venables, 2016, pp. 161–183). In support of the "resource curse" hypothesis, 
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Ali and Abdellatif  (2015) claim that the abundance of natural resources, especially oil, 
encourages military spending and hence it has a negative impact on the country's economy 
(Ali & Abdellatif, 2015, p. 5). Additionally, Sami and Ali (2015) viewed the natural resource 
abundance as a curse in the Arab World region since this part of the world is characterized by 
lack of democracy and political rights, centralization of the government and the lack of 
freedom rights in addition to being characterized by high level of gender, education and 
opportunity inequality (Sami & Ali, 2015).  
Henderson (2016) said that the idea of rent-seeking was developed by Gordon Tullock 
in 1967 and is connected to the natural resources. The word "rent" does not refer to payment 
on a lease but rather to gaining control of land or other natural resources (Henderson, 2016). 
The theory of a "rentier state" was proposed by Mahdavy in 1970 (Mahdavy, 1970). 
Beblawi and Luciana (1990) further described it in the Arab World by the country that has 
"only a small proportion of the working population actually involved in the generation of the 
rent and where the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent" (Beblawi 
& Luciani, 1990, p. 87). 
Ulfelder (2007) stated that "Countries with substantial resource wealth are more 
autocratic and this effect is robust to other measures proposed to explain the dearth of 
democracy in the Middle East or the Muslim world." (Ulfelder, 2007) 
Additionally, Ross (2008) added that research links gender inequality in the Middle East 
to resource wealth (Ross, 2008 , pp. 107-123). Simmons (2016) said that a study on the US 
finds similar results: resource wealth leads to lower levels of female labor force participation, 
lower turnout and fewer seats held by women in parliaments/congress (Simmons, 2016, pp. 
115-152). 
4. Determinants of Economic inequality 
There is debate in literature explaining the causes of income inequality or different levels 
of wealth. Those factors are summarized below:  
4.1. Wages/Income 
People are not paid similar wages or income. According to Hazlitt (1988), wage is 
determined by the market price of the skills required for the job. The wage is a function 
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between the demand and supply laws governing the needed job skill. The more skills needed, 
the higher the wage. Some get millions while others are only paid minimum wage (Hazlitt, 
1988).  
 
Becker and Murphy (2007) added that education level is one of the very important factors 
that affect wage determination since individuals with higher education will have more 
advanced skills to offer, justifying a higher wage (Becker & Murphy , 2007).  
 
Moreover, Chiu (1998) stated that individuals possessing different innate abilities will 
have different levels of wealth, leading to economic inequality "Factors like innate ability 
instead of a better starting point are the most important determining factors in the wealth 
accumulated by a person." (Chiu, 1998, pp. 44-59). A lot of people believe that smarter 
people tend to have higher income and hence more wealth. So, equally capable individuals 
may have totally different priorities and savings patterns, resulting in a difference in their 
levels of accumulated wealth (Boserup, Kopczuk, & Kreiner, 2016).  
 
Most importantly, in 2007, the research department of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) acknowledged that technological advancement has widened the income gap 
(Jaumotte, Lall, Papageorgiou, & Topalova, 2007). Technology causes damage at all skill 
levels but especially for the un-skilled workers. Machines replaced the un-skilled workers 
and decreased the available job opportunities since machinery works more effectively and 
efficiently in repetitive tasks. Education and skills become interrelated with the technology 
and automation factor as technology requires skilled educated workers. The increase in the 
demand for skilled labor, that will operate those machines, led to an increase in their relative 
wages. Thus, it widened the income gap among those skilled workers and the relatively un-
skilled ones. The demand for more skilled workers due to technological booming is referred 
to in literature as "Skilled Biased Technological Change (SBTC)" (Galor & Tsiddon, 1997, 
pp. 363-382). 
 
Martin Ford (2009) argues that:  
"income inequality is likely to continue increasing as more jobs become susceptible to 
automation. As robotics and artificial intelligence develop further, even many skilled jobs 
may be threatened. Technologies such as machine learning may ultimately allow 
computers to do many knowledge-based jobs that require significant education. This may 
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result in substantial unemployment at all skill levels, stagnant or falling wages for most 
workers, and increased concentration of income and wealth as the owners of capital 
capture an ever larger fraction of the economy" (Ford, 2009). 
 
4.2. Gender inequality in education and employment, age and type of family 
In many countries, there is an income gap based on gender in the labor market. Men and 
women having the same job most probably don't earn the same wage. For example, as per a 
report of the US Census Bureau, in America, the median full-time salary for women is 77 
percent of that of men (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). Adding to that, Dollar and Gatti (1999) 
say that gender discrimination in education slows economic growth and lower income leading 
to higher inequality (Dollar & Gatti, 1999). 
 
It is well understood and expected also that older people tend to earn higher income than 
younger workers, especially when the job requires some kind of experience. 
 
Additionally, Rugaber and Boak (2014)  also note that some social factors such as the 
type of families and the qualifications of its members affect economic inequality. "Single-
parent families are more likely to be poor than other families and less likely to ascend the 
income ladder. Finally, men and women with college degrees and high pay are more likely to 
marry each other and amplify income gaps." (Rugaber & Boak, 2014) 
 
4.3. Globalization trends 
Paul Krugman (2008) supports the proposition that globalization or international trade is 
an important cause of inequality. "Because of increasing trade among countries, workers in 
richer countries face a higher level of competition from those in poorer countries, especially 
in jobs that do not require a high level of skill" (Krugman, 2008, p. 105).  
 
Rugaber and Boak (2014) argued that Globalization has "created "superstars" and 
concentrated pay among corporate executives, Wall Street traders, popular entertainers and 
other financial elite. At the same time, factory workers now compete with 3 billion people in 
China, India, Eastern Europe and elsewhere who weren't working for multinational 
corporations 20 years ago. Many now make products for Apple, Intel, General Motors and 
others at low wages. This has depressed middle-class pay. And pay has risen much faster for 
college graduates than for high-school graduates. These trends have contributed to a 
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"hollowed out" labor market, with more jobs at the higher and lower ends of the pay scale 
and fewer in the middle." (Rugaber & Boak, 2014) 
 
4.4. Macroeconomic factors and Government policies 
Vitez (2016) said that the type of economies that the government follows affects its level 
of inequality. Although the socialist economies restrict the growth of individuals promoting 
equality, it ends up creating inequality. Also, in capitalist economies, economic inequality 
will be intensified the more the government intervention is curtailed (Vitez, 2016). 
In countries with lack of social service systems offered by the government, some people are 
extremely wealthy, while others suffer inhumane situations including starvation lack of basic 
necessities. On the other hand, in countries with adequate social service systems, the gap 
between the poorest and the richest class of people is narrower (Dye, 2016). Additionally, in 
the latter countries, poor children will have an opportunity for a better future than their 
parents. 
Additionally, Vitez (2016) added that inequality can be fostered by implementing poor fiscal 
or monetary policy. 
"For example, allowing increases to the money supply through loose central 
banking can create rampant inflation, which eats away at the purchasing power 
of a nation’s currency. Lower-income individuals can experience more 
problems with inflation as they have fewer dollars by which to create a 
standard of living." (Vitez, 2016) 
5. Wealth Concentration  
Wealth concentration is an ongoing process. Newly created wealth concentrates in the 
hands of already-wealthy individuals through capital inheritance. According to this note, 
those who already hold wealth have the means to invest in new sources of creating wealth or 
to otherwise leverage the accumulation of wealth, thus are the beneficiaries of the new 
wealth. Over time, wealth condensation can significantly contribute to the persistence of 
inequality within society and widening the gap to its utmost.  
During the past few years, economists view that economic inequality, nowadays, is not 
simply caused by the traditional and largely studied causes. However, it is a result of what is 
known as "Wealth Concentration". The new trend in studying the determinants of economic 
inequality is now focusing on the effect of capital rate of return on the level of inequality.   
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According to Dye (2016), when assessing economic inequality, one has to consider a 
person's wealth. Wealth is measured by the amount of money (capital) and possessions a 
person own. It determines the standard of living and the purchasing ability of the person. 
It doesn't only determine what they can do now, but it also determines their future 
standards (Dye, 2016).   
He added that "It is common to find that those with the most wealth and the best 
standards of living are also those with substantial inflows of money." (Dye, 2016) 
As per Karl Marx (1867), Capital accumulation (also termed the capital formation) is 
"the dynamic that motivates the pursuit of profit, involving the investment of money or any 
financial asset with the goal of increasing the initial monetary value of said asset as a 
financial return whether in the form of profit, rent, interest, royalties or capital gains" (Marx, 
1867) .  
Pierson and Hacker (2010) believed in the note of "“The rich get richer; the poor get 
poorer” is not just a cliché but rather a concept by itself. Under certain conditions, newly 
created wealth is concentrated in the possession of already-wealthy individuals." (Pierson & 
Hacker, 2010) 
The above note on wealth concentration is to be extended to include the children of rich 
families as per the publication of the National Bureau of Economic Research implies.  
Boserup, Kopczuk, & Kreiner (2016) claim that the Children born in a rich family have 
economic privileges as their inherited wealth will not only affect their starting capital but 
possibly extend that advantage and offer them better education opportunities, which may 
increase their chances of earning a higher income than their peers. This wealth transfer 
through the different generations creates a vicious cycle for economic inequality (Boserup, 
Kopczuk, & Kreiner, 2016). 
Potter (2014) discussed that the effect of wealth accumulation on widening the economic 
inequality is heavily supported by Piketty. He added that Piketty particularly relates 
increasing inequality to high income earned by wealth (or capital) and steep increases in CEO 
salaries (Potter, 2014). 
 
Piketty (2014) shows that in almost every country in his study, the wealth gap has 
widened since 1980. He anticipates that inequality will remain as long as the aforementioned 
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wealth concentration process persists through generations. He conveys that the top have 
excelled in their ability to get a larger share of the pie. He specified that "wealth persists over 
time, particularly due to inheritances." (Piketty, 2014, pp. 432-6) 
 
Piketty (2014) also added that the statistics show economic inequality is not just the top 10 
percent of the population is richer than the bottom 20 percent. Rather, it is “1 percent versus 
the remaining 99 percent,” i.e. the top 1 percent of the population has the vast majority of 
wealth in the economy and control of financial markets. (Piketty, 2014, p. 346). 
 
Rugaber and Boak state that a large gap always existed between the richest people and 
the poorest. What's puzzling is the widening gap between the wealthiest and the rest of the 
economic classes (Rugaber & Boak, 2014). 
 
World Bank researchers Lakner and Branko agree with Piketty's preposition that 
inequality in rich countries has been deteriorating since 1988 (Onselen, 2014). In Oxfam’s 
Working Paper, statistics show that in 24 of 26 countries researched, indeed the richest 1 
percent increased their share of income between 1980 and 2012. The share of national wealth 
owned by the wealthiest 1 percent in the U.S. greatly increased after 2008, meaning the top 1 
percent has captured 95 percent of post-financial crisis growth since 2009, whereas the low-
income population became poorer (Fuentes-Nieva, Ricardo, & Galasso, 2014). 
 
Hudson (2014) builds on Piketty's capital theory of wealth accumulation and 
intensifies the effect of capital by noting that  
"economic inequality persists because the top 1 percent exploits the remaining 
population and makes the latter “in debt” to the former." (Hudson, 2014) 
 
Additionally, Piketty and Saez (2003) have argued that tax policy in the post-World War II 
era has indeed increased income inequality by enabling the wealthiest Americans far greater 
access to capital than lower-income ones (Piketty & Saez, 2003). Taxes cause an ongoing 
debate between politicians and economists over the role of tax policy in dealing with wealth 
inequality. Politicians use taxes as a tool in their political campaigns to gain the votes of the 
wealthiest by lowering capital gains' taxes. 
25 
 
6. Is Inequality good or bad for a country's development? 
This question remains the most important to ask:  
"Is a more equal distribution of income good or bad for country's development?" 
(Soubbotina & Sheram, 2000) 
The answer to this question in practical life varies. An excessive equal income distribution is 
not in favor of economic efficiency and long term growth (Clarke G. , 1995, pp. 403–27); 
(Temple, 1999, pp. 112–56); (Stiglitz J. , 2009, pp. 1-2); (Edsall, 2014). Low inequality in 
socialists' countries removed all incentives needed for the citizens to engage in economic 
activities. This led to poor quality, limited variety of goods and services and slow technical 
progress. This has in turn lowered the pace of the economic growth and led to more poverty.  
As opposed to that, excessive inequality also hindered the quality of health and education that 
citizens are getting. Furthermore, higher inequality threatens the country's political stability 
as more people become dissatisfied with their economic status causing unrest and curtailing 
the investment opportunities by the investors who refuse to bear the added risk for the turmoil 
to generate revenues and create capital (Becker & Murphy, 2007). This in turn lowers the 
development potential and the growth for that country. 
Vitez (2016) said that "Economic inequality is not always a bad thing. It can create a 
desire to improve one’s life and move from one economic class to another. On the 
other hand, it may also drive individuals into the political arena, where they become 
involved in voting and changing poor macroeconomics policies" (Vitez, 2016). 
 
Some inequality is needed to reward hard work, talent and innovation. But a wealth gap that's 
too wide is usually unhealthy as it can slow economic growth. 
Sivy (2012) mentioned that "Total equality is neither possible nor desirable, since it 
would require a completely stagnant society — one without growth opportunities or 
economic incentives to succeed. But to increase future prosperity and restore 
historical social mobility, policymakers need to focus on reducing the bad causes of 
inequality" (Sivy, 2012). 
7. Consequences of economic inequality 
Soubbotina & Sheram (2000) declared that high inequality threatens a country’s 
political stability because more people are dissatisfied with their economic status. They 
26 
 
added that this will make it harder to reach political consensus. This instability will in 
turn increase the risks for investment and lower a country's development potential 
(Soubbotina & Sheram, 2000). Werfhorst (2011) added that increasing income inequality 
resulted in lower engagement of the less wealthy in all forms of social, cultural, and civic 
participation (Werfhorst, 2011). 
 
 Agreeing with Soubbotina & Sheram and Werfhost, Birdsong says that high economic 
inequality is associated with instability, both politically and socially. Societies with high 
economic inequality suffer from lower long-term GDP growth rates, higher crime rates, 
poorer public health, increased political inequality, and lower average education levels. He 
clarifies that since wealth will be concentrated in the hands of a small number, political 
power will incline in favor of that small wealthy group which may manipulate government 
through both legal processes and corrupt practices. Wealthy groups receive political 
advantages in several different ways. Average or poor working class groups will be less able 
to become educated or participate in the political process since they have no money to 
finance their studies and education (Birdsong, 2015). 
 
According to Dye (2016), income and wealth disparities affect the citizens' access to 
services that should be made available by governments to everyone. This list of necessities 
includes food, health care, and education. Another problem often connected with economic 
inequality is the ability for the wealthiest class to influence the political stage, which will 
directly affect all of the economic classes. 
 
8. Inequality in MENA 
According to Ncube & Anyanwu (2012), the region is classified as one of the fastest 
growing regions in population reaching an estimate of 357.3 million in 2014 (Ncube & 
Anyanwu, 2012). 
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Sample MENA 
countries in year 
2005 
Income share held by 
lowest 10% 
Income share held by 
highest 10% 
Iran 2.54 29.55 
Tunisia 2.52 29.07 
Turkey 1.95 31.73 
Yemen 3.28 29.99 
West Bank 2.93 26.70 
Egypt 3.96 26.57 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators 
(World Bank, 2016) 
 
8.1. MENA Political Outlook 
MENA region is in turmoil. Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen are in high conflict, causing 
severe damage the country's infrastructure and reset its development achievement back by 
decades.  "Fifteen million people left their homes to fragile or economically strapped 
countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Djibouti and Tunisia, giving rise to the biggest refugee 
crisis since World War II. Blockades and repeated cycles of violence have made Gaza’s 
unemployment rate the highest in the world and with Gross Domestic Product at only 40 
percent of its potential." (World Bank, 2016) Countries undergoing political transitions, such 
as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, have to prioritize security issues over growth-
promoting policies. The relatively peaceful oil exporters, such as Algeria, Iran and the Gulf 
Countries (GCC), are suffering low oil prices with high youth and female unemployment and 
undiversified economies.  
8.2. MENA Economic Outlook 
As per the World Bank data, Growth in MENA is expected to be about 2.9 percent in 
2015, considerably below the 4-5 percent growth the region enjoyed from 2000-2010.  This is 
as a result of the prolonged political instability in the countries in conflict; the terrorist 
incidents in Tunisia; the low oil prices that are dragging down growth in oil exporters; and 
the slow pace of political and economic reforms that delays the return of investment climate 
(World Bank, 2016). 
In addition, the World Bank estimated that the Gulf countries could lose about US$215 
billion in oil revenues, equivalent to 14% of their combined GDP, in 2015.  The Economic 
Growth for this group is estimated at 3.2 in 2015.  Fiscal deficits continue at a level of 8.8 
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percent of GDP in 2015. Growth in developing MENA countries will be about 2.3 percent in 
2015, one percentage higher than 2014, owing to better-than-expected growth in oil 
importers- estimated at 3.7 in 2015 and 2016. Among developing oil exporters, Iran’s 
economic prospects could improve following the lifting of sanctions and the nuclear deal 
signed in 2015.  The eventual increase in Iran’s oil exports could boost economic activity and 
accelerate growth to an estimated 5.8% in 2016. 
For the countries in conflict, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, economic prospects are low. 
They direct a huge portion of their military expenditures to combat ISIS. This increase in 
military expenditures coupled with low oil prices and the decline in economic activity in the 
areas occupied by ISIS have hit their economies (World Bank, 2016). 
As per Soubbotina and Sheram (2000), the inequality ratio is 6:1 in MENA countries i.e. 
the richest 20% quintile gets 6 times what the poorest 20% quintile in that region (Soubbotina 
& Sheram, 2000).  
 
MENA countries vary into how unequal each country is. Some of MENA Gulf countries 
benefit from having abundance in the natural resources especially in oil reserves. However, 
according to Stijns (2006), their increased dependence on that natural endowment 
transformed the blessing into a curse when this caused a limitation in their diversification of 
economies and a leaning towards gender inequality in education and employment (Stijns, 
2006, pp. 1060-1083).  This huge dependence on oil returns in turn dramatized their capital 
and resources when oil prices went down leading to a decline in their growth and a 
heightening for their economic inequality gap. The other MENA countries have also 
benefited from the capital and the natural resources available in the rich oil countries. Their 
people have migrated to those oil-rich countries and worked with higher salaries than their 
originating countries.  Hence, whether an oil exporter or not, countries in MENA region were 
highly affected by the volatility of the oil sector in recent years. 
 
Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2014) have studied the patterns of inequality in 
MENA from 1985-2009. Their empirical research concluded that income inequality reduced 
economic growth and increased poverty rates in the region (Ncube, Anyanwu, & Hausken, 
2014, pp. 435-453). 
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The region was characterized by a divergence of wealth and power leading to high 
autocracy. Rulers and elite businessmen augmented their wealth and suppressed any local 
opposition to their formulated socio-economic policies aiming to reserve their capital, 
authority and autocratic power. By the end of 2010 and early 2011, the rise of the Arab 
Spring brought all the economic, political and social deficiencies in MENA region to the 
forefront and all of the consequences of economic inequality discussed above proved on the grounds 
of reality. According to Ortiz and Cummins (2011), the region has a relatively high rate of 
income inequality, 38.2% (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011).  
Sami & Ali (2015) stated that the research conducted to study the inequality in MENA is 
very limited compared to the one done to study the same concept in other regions of the 
world especially, the developed ones in US, OECD and some of the Asian countries. This is 
may be related to the limited data available on MENA in addition to the negligence of MENA 
autocratic governments to collect data and adhere to transparency with their people before 
anyone else (Sami & Ali, 2015); (Ali, 2012). 
According to World Bank Lead Economist, Ianchovichina (2015), most of the wealth data 
should come from tax records which are misstated, if not faked, in the region. The extent of 
wealth inequality in MENA is always underestimated or distorted. One can only read about 
the size of wealth of the region's billionaires (1% highest people income bracket) in Forbes. 
Adding to this, the wealth size of the richest is hidden in tax haven bank deposits. However, 
in spite of the limited data available about wealth and income in MENA countries and the 
questions raised around its accuracy, some notes can be inferred from the corporate data. 
Most of the largest companies in the region have government officials or royal family 
members as boards of directors. Additionally, most of the largest companies in Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Morocco are not listed on the stock exchanges of these countries. Instead, they 
are either firms privately owned by prominent families or state-owned firms (Ianchovichina, 
2015). "Wealth appears to have been accumulated by a few private citizens who’ve taken 
advantage of their positions at work or their affiliations with powerful families and members 
of the elite." (Ianchovichina, 2015) In short, ordinary people don't have capital accessibility 
or don't share in the profits generated by these prosperous companies. The middle class and 
the lower social classes of people, which are the largest percentage of the population in the 
region, are positioned at a huge gap against the wealthiest class (Ianchovichina, 2015). 
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According to Schiffbauer et al. (2015), wealth or capital inequality is greater but difficult 
to measure than income inequality. In MENA, the capital accumulation for publicly traded 
companies in stock markets does not seem to be higher than the rest of the world. Most of the 
large companies are either privately-owned by few well known families or government-
owned. He added that these large companies are few since most of the companies are 
informal and small-size (Schiffbauer, Hussain, Sahnoun, & Keefer, 2015).  
Alvaredo (2011) stated that measuring economic inequality is a difficult task, where 
comprehensive administrative information on income and wealth are generally unavailable. 
"Inequality measures are often based on household surveys that suffer from several well-
known shortcomings. Apart from the difficulty of recalling income and wealth information 
correctly, survey respondents may under-report expenditures or deliberately leave out income 
and wealth that result from illegal or informal activities. In addition, these surveys typically 
include few individuals at the very top of the income distribution, although capturing 
accurately the “top one percent” is crucial to estimating inequality….. In MENA, these 
difficulties are compounded by the fact that access to household surveys is limited" 
(Alvaredo, 2011). 
Figure 2: Economic Inequality Measured by Theil Index for sample countries in 
MENA  
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from UTIP-UNIDO, 2016  
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As per Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011), using data from household surveys to measure 
the economic inequality has well-known drawbacks due to the tendency for the top tail of the 
distribution to be underrepresented. This urged the researchers to use administrative data such 
as tax records to estimate the income of the very rich (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011, p. 
44). However, Alvaredo and Piketty (2015) added that the use of administrative data, 
typically tax records, to estimate the income of the very rich cannot be used in MENA since 
the availability of proper tax record data is still limited due to tax evasion in Arab Countries 
(Alvaredo & Piketty, 2015). 
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Chapter Three: Data  
This research uses panel data for countries representing the MENA region for 49 
years starting from 1963 until 2012.  
1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the economic inequality measured by Theil Index, which 
was computed following the methodology applied by the University of Texas Inequality 
Project (UTIP)-UNIDO. It is a global data set that calculates the industrial pay-inequality 
measures for 167 countries from 1963-2008. It has a total of 4054 observations based on the 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics (Galbraith J. , 2016). Some of the missing values for Theil were 
filled in using Sara Sami's calculations from UNIDO CD-ROM as part of her data collection 
for her study about the relationship between inequality and economic growth by applying the 
formula:  Theil =     ୷౟୷  	log ሺ
୷౟
୷ ୒⁄ ሻ 	 
Where: N is the total employment,	y୧ is multiplication of total wages and total 
employees per year, and Y is the total sum of multiplications of wages by employees (Sami & 
Ali, 2015).  
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables are different measures that indicate capital formation, rate of 
return on capital, economic growth and socio-economic aspect. All independent variables' 
data in this research were downloaded from the World Bank online database (World Bank, 
2016). 
 
2.1. Capital Formation variables 
 
2.1.1. Gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP 
According to the World Bank, gross domestic savings are calculated as gross domestic 
product (GDP) less final consumption expenditure (total consumption) (World Bank, 
2016). As was discussed earlier in the literature review, an individual's earnings 
(income/wage) is one of the crucial determinants of inequality and the more the person 
earns, the more is his probability to save and hence improve his economic class among his 
peers.  
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Figure 3: Gross Domestic Savings in sample MENA countries 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators 
database  
 
As shown in Figure 3 above, the Gross Domestic Savings over the years for the chosen 
countries seem to carry a similar pattern with Iran and Kuwait as the highest two countries 
for their large share in natural resources endowment, especially oil as will be shown later in 
figure 5.  
 
2.1.2. Gross fixed capital formation in constant Dollars 
According to the World Bank, gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. Net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation 
(World Bank, 2016). 
Therefore, in this study, our model will use the above two independent variables on 
capital formation to test the hypothesis that the increase in capital formation will increase 
the economic inequality. This is consistent with what the literature about Piketty's model on 
impact of capital formation on inequality and what his model tested on the effect of 
accumulated savings across generations. His model concluded that children of wealthy 
people have a higher chance of accumulating capital, which will increase the inequality 
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gap. One limitation to this test is that we have no way for differentiating the capital formed 
by the individual's own resources or through inheritance from his wealthy ancestors.   
 
It is expected from the literature that the above capital formation variables would have 
a negative impact on economic inequality in MENA i.e. when these variables increase, the 
inequality would increase simultaneously. 
2.2. Rate of return on capital variables 
2.2.1. Real interest rate (%) 
According to the World Bank, real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for 
inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The terms and conditions attached to lending 
rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability (World Bank, 2016).  
 
2.2.2. Deposit interest rate (%) 
According to the World Bank, deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or 
similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. The terms and conditions attached 
to these rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability (World Bank, 
2016). It is widely known that deposit interest rate is one of the measures of rate of 
return on capital. In other words, the deposit interest rate (nominal rate) is the announced 
percentage of deposit rate without taking inflation into account. It can refer to interest 
earned, capital gains returns, or economic measures like GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
(Petch, 2016) 
Hence, in this model, we will test the hypothesis that increasing rate of return on 
capital (deposit) will increase the economic inequality. This is to conclude if Piketty's 
hypothesis is valid for countries of the MENA region. 
In addition, methodologically, real interest rate and deposit interest rate are 
interacting. Higher deposit rate means higher real interest rate. So, creating interaction 
term between the two variables is warranted. 
 
It is expected from the literature that the above variables, used as indicators of capital 
rate of returns, would have a negative impact on economic inequality in MENA i.e. when 
these variables increase, the inequality would increase simultaneously. 
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Figure 4: Deposit Interest Rate in sample MENA countries 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators        
database  
2.3. Economic Growth Variables 
2.3.1. GDP growth  
According to the World Bank, annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP) at market prices based on constant local currency. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation 
of natural resources (World Bank, 2016). 
It is expected from the literature on GDP Growth that this variable would have a 
positive impact on economic inequality in MENA i.e. when it increases, the inequality 
would decrease simultaneously. 
 
2.3.2. Oil rents as a percentage of GDP 
According to the World Bank, oil rents are the difference between the value of crude 
oil production at world prices and total costs of production (World Bank, 2016). The 
literature identifies that the abundance of natural resources in MENA, especially oil and 
gas, is a Curse and that oil rents have a negative and slowing impact on economic 
growth. Thus, it heightens economic inequality. This hypothesis will be tested in our 
model of study.  
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It is expected from the literature of "resource curse" that this variable would have a 
negative impact on economic inequality in MENA i.e. when it increases, the inequality 
would increase simultaneously. 
 
Figure 5: Oil Rents in sample MENA countries 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators        
database  
 
As shown in Figure 5 above, the Oil rents over the years for the three chosen countries seem 
to carry a similar pattern for their large share in oil natural endowment which is considered as 
one of the main wealth drivers of these countries. 
 
2.3.3. GDP per capita in constant Dollars 
According to the World Bank, GDP per capita is gross domestic product (GDP) 
divided by midyear population. GDP is, as mentioned above, the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources (World Bank, 2016). 
 
2.3.4. Trade as a percentage of GDP 
According to the World Bank, trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic product (World Bank, 2016). 
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2.3.5. Manufacturing, value added as a percentage of GDP 
According to the World Bank, manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC 
divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (World Bank, 2016).  
2.4. Socio-economic Variable 
 
2.4.1. Out-of-school children of primary school age, female  
According to the World Bank, out-of-school children of primary school age are 
female children in the official primary school age range who are not enrolled in either 
primary or secondary schools (World Bank, 2016). For this study, this is control variable 
used to capture socioeconomic status, a determinant of how gender inequality can affect 
inequality in the region. 
 
The purpose of this study is to add to the limited research and data analysis available 
in MENA to understand the effect of capital formation and capital rate of returns for MENA 
countries on inequality, holding other variables including economic growth, natural resources 
rent and education for girls. 
Table 1 shows a sample list of the data used in this study. The sample contains a 
randomly selected year for each of the twenty MENA countries we studied. It lists the Theil 
Index as well as all the other independent variables we studied for capital formation and 
capital rate of return along with the controlling variables for Economic growth and socio-
economic factors. For example, the lowest Theil Index in the selected sample was reported 
for 0.002 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1996 i.e. in 1996, UAE had an almost 
economically equal population. On the other hand, the largest Theil Index in the random 
sample was reported for 0.40 in Bahrain in 1992 i.e. in 1992, Bahrain had a very high 
economic inequality among its population. Another example is the Gross Domestic Savings; 
the highest rate in the sample was almost 70% of GDP and was found in Qatar in 2005.  The 
worst in the sample was in Lebanon in 2007. 
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Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators 
database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 6: Inequality and Deposit Interest Rate in MENA 
 
         Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 6 (Cont'd): Inequality and Deposit Interest Rate in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between inequality and deposit interest rate in 
selected MENA countries. The available data on deposit interest rate is very limited and starts 
in late1970s and early 1980s. All graphs illustrated in figure 6 show that there is an 
inconsistent relationship between inequality and deposit interest rate across the selected 
countries. The inconsistence ranges from having no relationship whatsoever to having 
changing relationship between the variables depicted by the graph across the years within the 
same country.  
 
For Algeria, the graph shows that no relationship exists between the variables under 
study. From 1984 until 1996, Theil index was almost constant while deposit rate was rising. 
Even when the deposit rate changed direction from 1996 until 2004 and started a declining 
trend, Theil index had a sudden increase in 1998 then resumed being constant. As for Qatar, 
the graph shows that no relationship exists between the variables under study as well. Theil 
index was constant regardless of the variation in the deposit rate. In Syria, Theil index was 
constant from 1979 until 2002, moving independently of the changes in deposit rate. 
However, from 2003 until 2007, the variables followed the same direction of change.  
 
In Egypt, Turkey and Kuwait, the graph depicts a relationship between the two 
variables. For Egypt, the graph shows that inequality and deposit rate move in the same 
direction from 1976, both variables were increasing steadily and reached peaks until 1994. 
Then, from 1995 until 1999, they started moving in opposite directions when Theil was 
increasing, deposit rate was decreasing. In 2000, they changed direction and started following 
a decrease pattern. In Kuwait, the variables were moving in opposite directions until 1988 
when they started following the same pattern. Additionally, Turkey's graph also shows a 
relationship between the two variables as inequality and deposit rate were almost constant 
from 1973 until 1980 and then moved in the same change direction whether increasing or 
decreasing. As for Oman, Theil and deposit rate kept moving in opposite direction until 2002 
when they started moving in the same direction.  
 
As opposed, in Morocco, Theil and deposit rate started by increasing along from 1978 
until 1981. Then they moved in opposite direction until 1984 when they started following the 
same direction of increasing until 1988. For the following nine years until 1997, the variables 
had no relationship. Deposit was stable while inequality kept declining. From then, they were 
both declining. 
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Figure 7: Inequality and Gross Domestic Savings in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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(Cont'd): Inequality and Gross Domestic Savings in MENA 7Figure   
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 7 (Cont'd): Inequality and Gross Domestic Savings in MENA 
 
   Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between inequality and gross domestic savings in 
selected MENA countries. All graphs illustrated in figure 7 show that there is a relationship 
between inequality and gross domestic savings across the selected countries with few 
exceptions.  
 
For Algeria and Tunisia, the graph shows that the variables under study are not 
related. For Algeria, from 1984, Theil index was constant while deposit rate was changing 
with an exceptional increasing move of Theil index in 1998 and then it remained constant 
from then until 2004. As for Tunisia, Theil was constant until 1984 when the inequality 
started slightly increasing accompanying a slight decrease in gross domestic savings until 
1994. This was followed by a changing move by Theil that was not accompanied by a change 
in gross domestic savings level. Same happened in Egypt from 1966 until 1998, Theil was 
almost constant regardless of changes in deposit rate with a sudden constant jump from 1999 
to 2001 then Theil started moving in opposite direction to the savings.  
 
As for Morocco, the graph shows that the relationship exists between the variables 
under study with both of them increasing in small steady moves. Only two peaks of unusual 
increase in Theil took in 1999 and 2006. In Iran, both variables under study were moving in 
opposite direction with Theil index decreasing and gross domestic savings increasing from 
1966 until 1970. Then, afterwards, they followed the same change direction from parallel 
decrease to increase ending with stability.  In Oman, both variables followed the same change 
direction until 2003 when they started moving in opposite directions. 
 
In Sudan, Syria and Turkey, Theil was following the same direction of the changing 
moves of the gross domestic savings with the exception of an increase peak in 1990 in Syria 
and in 2002 in Turkey where the jump in inequality was not accompanied by a change in 
gross domestic savings. In Saudi Arabia, Theil was increasing with gross domestic savings 
until 1995. Then, Theil stabilized while gross domestic savings kept increasing.   
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Figure 8: Inequality and Gross Fixed Capital formation in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 8 (cont'd): Inequality and Gross Fixed Capital formation in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between inequality and gross fixed capital 
formation in selected MENA countries. All graphs illustrated in figure 8 show that there is a 
relationship between inequality and gross fixed capital formation across the selected 
countries with few exceptions.  
 
For Algeria and Tunisia, the graph shows that the variables under study are not 
related. For Algeria, from 1969 until 1998, Theil index was constant while gross fixed capital 
was changing: increasing from 1969 until 1978, followed by a decrease until 1983, then an 
increase until 1985, then a decrease until 1988 and constant until 1997. In 1998, an 
exceptional increasing move of Theil index and then it remained constant from then until 
2004. In this same period, from 1998 until 2004, gross fixed capital was increasing 
incrementally. As for Tunisia, Theil was constant until 1984 when it started to slightly 
increase until 1994. This was followed by a changing decrease by Theil from 1996 to 1998. 
Then, it kept increasing until 2002 where it had a sudden decrease  followed by being 
constant afterwards. Those changes were independently going on without being affected by 
the increase in the gross fixed capital. Same happened in Egypt from 1966 until 1998, Theil 
was almost constant regardless of changes in the gross fixed capital with a sudden constant 
jump from 1999 to 2001 then Theil started moving in opposite direction with one exceptional 
peak in 2003.  
 
As for Sudan, Iran and Morocco, the graphs show that the relationship exists between 
the variables under study with both of them increasing in small steady moves. Only two 
peaks of unusual increase in Theil took place in Morocco in 1999 and 2006. In addition to an 
increase in this factor in Iran that was not affecting Inequality that remained stable from 2005 
onwards. In Oman, both variables followed the same change direction until 2003 when they 
started moving in opposite directions. 
 
  In Turkey, Theil was following the same direction of the changing moves of the gross 
fixed capital formation with a small time lag for the change between the two variables. As for 
Jordan, both variables moved in opposite directions. 
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Figure 9: Inequality and Oil Rents in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 9 (Cont'd): Inequality and Oil Rents in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 9 (Cont'd): Inequality and Oil Rents in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
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Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between inequality and oil rents in selected 
MENA countries. All graphs illustrated in figure 9 show that there is an inverse relationship 
between inequality and oil rents across the selected countries.  
 
For oil rich countries, such as Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the graph shows 
that the variables under study are indirectly related. When oil rents revenues increase, Theil 
index decreases signaling a lower economic inequality. This reflects the fact that having 
abundance of oil as a natural resource is considered one of the main drivers of wealth in these 
countries. That fact contradicts Piketty’s theory on the accumulation of wealth as a factor 
increasing inequality. It also opposes the literature on the paradox of plenty and the natural 
resources abundance curse. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology and Empirical Model 
1. Methodology 
According to Galbraith and Kum, "the use of the Theil index as a measure of 
inequality avoids many of the difficulties inherent in the use of the income distribution 
measures by Deininger and Squire data-Gini coefficient. The Theil Statistics are more 
consistent across time and countries" (Galbraith & Kum, 2004). While Galbraith and 
Pedro explained that "Theil's T statistic is part of the family of generalized entropy of 
inequality measures; benefits of its use include its useful ability to be decomposed exactly 
into within-group and between-group components" (Galbraith & Pedro, 2001). 
 
Panel or longitudinal data was used in this study, where N was observed over T time 
periods. We studied 20 countries of the MENA region over a 49-year period from 1963 to 
2012. However, the data used is unbalanced as it is not continuously completed for all 
countries. 
2. Empirical Model 
In our study, we used both the "fixed effect" and "Random effect" regression model 
having constant the average effects of each country. By including fixed effects, we are 
controlling for the average differences between the countries and hence greatly reducing the 
threat of omitted variable bias. 
The model estimates the relation between economic inequality and capital rate of return: 
Model	THEIL	୧୲ൌ   β0 + β1GDSit +  β2 GFCAPCit + β3REALINTit  + β4DPSTINTit + 
β5DEPINTRINit  +  β6GDPGit  + β7 OILRNTit  + β8 OILGROWTHit + 
β9GDPCit + β10 GDPPGit + β11 TRADEGit + β12 MNFGit +  β13 CHOSCFit 
+  vi + Ø t + εit 
Where: country (i), time (t), Theil Index (THEILit), Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 
(GDSit), Gross fixed capital formation (constant 2005 US$) (GFCAPCit), Real interest rate 
(%) (REALINTit), Deposit interest rate (%) (DPSTINTit), Interaction Variable between Real 
Interest and Deposit Interest (DEPINTRINit), GDP growth (annual %) (GDPGit), oil rents as 
percent of GDP (OILRNTit), Interaction Variable between Oil rent and GDP growth (annual 
%) (OILGROWTHit ), GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) (GDPCit), Interaction Variable 
between GDP growth (annual %) and GDP per Capita (GDPPGit), Trade (% of GDP) 
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(TRADEGit), Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) (MNFGit), Out-of-school children of 
primary school age, female (number) (CHOSCFit), the country effect (ν), the time effect (Ø), 
and the error term (ɛ). 
Below is Table 2 summarizing all the independent variables used in this study's empirical 
model. 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators database 
and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 
 
Independent Variables Description
GDS Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)
GFCAPC Gross fixed capital formation (constant 2005 US$)
REALINT Real interest rate (%)
DPSTINT Deposit interest rate (%)
DEPINTRIN Interaction Variable between Real Interest and Deposit Interest
GDPG GDP growth (annual %)
OILRNT Oil rents (% of GDP)
OILGROWTH
Interaction Variable between Oil rent and GDP growth (annual 
%)
GDPC GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)
GDPPG
Interaction Variable between GDP growth (annual %) and 
GDP per Capita
TRADEG Trade (% of GDP)
MNFG Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)
CHOSCF Out-of-school children of primary school age, female (number)
Socio-economic:
Economic Growth:
Table 2: Description of Independent Variables and Data unit
Capital Formation:
Capital Rate of Return:
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Chapter Five: Model Results and Discussions 
This thesis aimed to investigate the effect of the capital formation and the capital rate 
of return on economic inequality in MENA region using panel data from 1963-2012 while 
controlling other factors of economic growth and socio-economic conditions. We will 
explain, in this chapter, the findings reached in this study using STATA 11 Software, making 
use of the data downloaded from the World Bank indicators database and University of Texas 
Inequality Project – United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UTIP-UNIDO) 
industrial data statistics (Galbraith J. , 2016). 
Table 3 summarizes the statistics of the variables. As mentioned in chapter 3, Theil index is 
the dependent variable of the model and it measures the economic inequality. It has 598 
observations with an average of 0.090 and a standard deviation of 0.095 with the highest 
value of 0.58934 in Bahrain in 1994. Gross domestic savings has 724 observations with an 
average of 23.8% of Gross Domestic Product. As for the deposit interest rate, it has an 
average of 10.6% in a range between 0.69% and 438%, with the lowest value depicted for 
Djibouti in 2006.  
  
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators 
database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 using Stata 11 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
THEIL 598 0.090 0.095 0 0.589
1) Capital Formation:
GDS 724 23.79983 19.48053 -66.95316 80.66445
GFCAPC (millions) 419 17,900                 22,700                     39.6 139,000               
2) Capital Rate of Return:
REALINT 343 4.072 12.628 -36.267 88.100
DPSTINT 477 10.593 25.067 0.688 438.358
DEPINTRIN 336 200.958 2238.017 -619.621 38619.370
3) Economic Growth:
GDPG 795 5.181 9.553 -64.047 104.487
OILRNT 767 19.669 19.381 0.000 86.982
OILGROWTH 709 107.156 374.714 -2840.098 5914.889
GDPC 783 8,692.244            13,502.520              401.944               81,788.950          
GDPPG 769 53,258.820          176,672.900            (689,592.400)      1,952,693.000     
TRADEG 784 73.374 36.050 0.021 251.139
MNFG 545 12.066 5.583 0.100 25.741
3) Socio-economic:
CHOSCF 389 208,583.700        300,816.500            37.000                 1,537,855.000     
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
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The results found from the fixed effect models are almost consistent with the results 
found from the random effect models. In both models, there is a positive relationship 
between inequality and each of the following variables: Gross domestic savings, Value 
added of manufacturing, the interaction variable between Oil rent and GDP growth  and  
the interaction variable between real and deposit interest. Similarly, both models have 
shown a negative relationship between inequality and each of the following variables: Real 
interest, Oil rents, Out-of-school female primary children, value added of trade and the 
interaction variable between GDP growth and GDP per capita.                                                                       
 
As opposed to the above consistency, few exceptions in results exist in some 
variables. The Gross fixed capital formation variable is positively related to inequality 
using the fixed effects across all models. However, the same variable is only positively 
related to inequality using the random effects on models 4 and 5, while being negatively 
related to inequality using the random effects on the reamining models 1, 2 and 3. 
Similarly, the GDP per Capita variable is negatively related to inequality using the fixed 
effects in models 4 and 5. However, the same variable is positively related to inequality 
using the random effects for the same models 4 and 5. Moreover, another exception could 
be spotted for the deposit interest rate variable. It is negatively related to inequality using 
either the fixed effects or the random effects across all models except in model 5. At this 
specific model, using the random effects, the deposit interest rate changes to be positively 
related to inequality. Also, GDP growth is positively related to inequality across all models 
except in Models 3 & 5 under the Fixed Effects where it is negatively related to inequality. 
 
    Source: Author's compilation from for Stata 11 results 
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Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators        
database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 using Stata 11 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1) Capital Formation:
GDS
0.003131
(2.04)**
0.003150
(2.03)**
0.005262
(2.28)**
0.003362
(2.17)**
0.007316
(3.19)**
GFCAPC
0.000004
(1.43)
0.000004
(1.45)
0.000006
(1.89)*
0.000006
(1.62)
0.000009
(2.16)**
2) Capital Rate of Return:
REALINT
-0.002847
(-1.96)**
-0.002929
(-1.96)**
-0.003777
(-2.24)**
-0.003061
(-1.84)*
-0.004369
(-2.39)**
DPSTINT
-0.003483
(-1.83)*
-0.003300
(-1.65)*
-0.001372
(-0.52)
-0.002208
(-1.07)
-0.001348
(-0.52)
DEPINTRIN
0.000395
(1.93)**
0.000405
(1.93)**
0.000449
(1.90)*
0.000383
(1.76)*
0.000511
(2.14)**
3) Economic Growth:
GDPG
0.000010
(0.56)
0.000008
(0.41)
-0.000007
(-0.30)
0.000005
(0.26)
-0.000020
(-0.87)
OILRNT
-0.006562
(-3.45)***
-0.006526
(-3.39)***
-0.006353
(-2.58)***
-0.011858
(-3.74)***
-0.013279
(-3.61)***
TRADEG
- -0.000042
(-0.32)
-0.000073
(-0.52)
-0.000044
(-0.34)
-0.000046
(-0.34)
MNFG
- - 0.003377
(0.78)
- 0.007015
(1.57)
OILGROWTH
- - - 0.000792
(2.32)**
0.001183
(2.76)***
GDPC
- - - -0.000009
(-0.26)
-0.000019
(-0.53)
GDPPG
- - - -0.000002
(-2.05)**
-0.000003
(-2.56)***
4) Socio-economic:
CHOSCF
-0.000005
(-1.88)*
-0.000005
(-1.83)*
-0.000004
(-1.25)
-0.000005
(-1.75)*
-0.000004
(-1.34)
Constant
0.063964
(1.06)
0.078977
(1.03)
-0.026519
(-0.23)
0.119632
(1.18)
-0.040073
(-0.34)
F
9.75 8.51 5.60 7.22 5.56
R2 
0.69 0.73 0.60 0.72 0.67
N
65 65 57 65 57
Notes:
*** Statistically Significant at 1% Significance level
**  Statistically Significant at 5% Significance level
*   Statistically Significant at 10% Significance level
Table 4: Fixed-effects Model Dependent Variable THEIL Index
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In Table 4, using the fixed-effects model on the panel regression data with dependent 
variable Theil index, the test results show that the variables of gross domestic savings, gross 
fixed capital formation and the interaction variable between deposit interest and real interest 
are positively related to the level of inequality across all models. For example, in model 1, a 
one percent increase in the gross domestic savings will increase the level of inequality by 0.3 
percent. The positive relationship between the level of inequality and the gross domestic 
savings is statistically significant across all models at 5%. As for the positive relationship 
between the level of inequality and the interaction variable between deposit interest and real 
interest, it is statistically significant across all models but at different significance levels: at 
5% for models 1, 2 and 5 and at 10% for models 3 and 4. This is as opposed to the  positive 
relationship between the level of inequality and the gross fixed capital formation which is 
only statistically significant in model 5 at 5% and in model 3 at 10%.  This supports the 
literature on Piketty's model when he claimed that the accumulation of wealth increases 
inequality. 
 
The results on GDP growth in MENA showed no significant impact on economic 
inequality by itself and the direction of the relationship was contradicting across the different 
tested models. They are positively related in models 1, 2 and 4 supporting Kuznets' theory of 
a necessary tradeoff  between growth and inequality and that growth slowers the development 
and hence increases poverty and inequality. However, being negatively related in models 3 
and 5 supports the ongoing debate in literature by Stiglitz. Adding these results to the fact 
that oil is known to be a mirror image of growth , we created the interaction variable between 
oil rent and GDP growth. The coefficient of this interaction variable is positively related to 
the level of inequality in model 4 at 5% statistical significance and in model 5 at 1% 
statistical significance.  
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Figure 10: Oil Rents and GDP Growth in MENA 
 
Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators        
database  
 
Same positive relationship exists between the level of inequality and the added value 
of the manufacturing in models 3 and 5 where the manufacturing variable was included in the 
model of study, but it is not statistically significant. 
 
On the other hand, the test results on the panel regression data of inequality show that 
the variables of the real interest, deposit interest, oil rent and the number of out-of-school 
female children of primary school age are negatively related to the level of inequality across 
all models. For example, in model 1, a one percent increase in the deposit interest will 
decrease the level of inequality by 0.3 percent and a one percent increase in oil rent in model 
4 will decrease the level of inequality by 1.1%. This contradicts Piketty's theory and the 
literature claiming that when we have a higher rate of return on capital and wealth, the 
economic inequality increases. The test shows that the negative relationship between the level 
of inequality and the real interest is statistically significant at 5% across all models, with the 
exception of model 4 where it is statistically significant at 10%. This is opposed to the 
negative relationship between the level of inequality and the deposit interest which is only 
statistically significant in models 1 and 2 at 10%. As for the negative relationship between the 
level of inequality and the oil rent, it is statistically significant across all models at 1%. This 
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defeats the literature debate on the curse of having abundant natural resources, especially oil 
in MENA countries. The debate accuses the huge revenues coming from the oil sector of 
slowering the economic growth since the other economic sectors will not be as competitive as 
the oil sector within the region's context of resources mismanagement and high corruption. 
Whereas the negative relationship between the level of inequality and the number of out-of-
school female children of primary school age is only statistically significant in models 1, 2 
and 4 at 10%.  
Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction variable between GDP growth and GDP 
per capita is negatively related to the level of inequality in model 4 at 5% statistical 
significance and in model 5 at 1% statistical significance. A negative realtionship also exists 
between the level of inequality and GDP per capita in models 4 and 5, but it is not 
statistically significant. The same negative relationship, with no statistical significance, exists 
between the level of inequality and trade in models 2, 3, 4 and 5.  
Although GDP growth added statistical significance to GDP per capita by creating the 
interaction variable but it is not statistically significant by itself as a variable, as I mentioned 
above. The GDP growth coefficient is negatively related to the level of inequality in models 3 
and 5. However, the coefficient is positively related to inequality in models 1, 2 and 4. 
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Source: Author's Calculations based on analysis of data from World Bank Indicators 
database and UTIP-UNIDO, 2016 using Stata 11 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1) Capital Formation:
GDS
0.002540
(2.07)**
0.000547
(0.66)
0.001026
(0.91)
0.000981
(1.33)
0.000244
(0.23)
GFCAPC
-0.000006
(-0.59)
-0.000004
(-0.65)
-0.000006
(-0.92)
0.000001
(1.94)**
0.000009
(1.11)
2) Capital Rate of Return:
REALINT
-0.001145
(-0.92)
-0.001223
(-0.85)
-0.000180
(-0.11)
-0.003110
(-2.30)**
-0.001625
(-0.87)
DPSTINT
-0.003482
(-1.99)**
-0.003061
(-1.55)
-0.001621
(-0.72)
-0.000693
(-0.35)
0.000148
(0.07)
DEPINTRIN
0.000297
(1.53)
0.000542
(2.39)***
0.000383
(1.48)
0.000678
(3.36)***
0.000476
(1.88)**
3) Economic Growth:
GDPG
0.000005
(0.10)
0.000013
(0.86)
0.000007
(0.43)
0.000013
(1.00)
0.000011
(0.76)
OILRNT
-0.002239
(-1.77)*
-0.000092
(-0.11)
-0.000369
(-0.33)
-0.006743
(-2.75)*
-0.004963
(-1.51)
TRADEG
- -0.000102
(-0.95)
-0.000079
(-0.70)
-0.000141
(-1.50)
-0.000128
(-1.25)
MNFG
- - 0.002963
(1.18)
- 0.001995
(0.76)
OILGROWTH
- - - 0.000568
(1.56)
0.000395
(0.83)
GDPC
- - - 0.000019
(3.09)**
0.000018
(2.31)**
GDPPG
- - - -0.000002(-2.01)**
-0.000002
(-1.35)
4) Socio-economic:
CHOSCF
-0.000010
(-4.53)***
-0.000006
(-3.10)***
-0.000008
(-3.28)***
-0.000007
(-3.70)***
-0.000007
(-2.96)**
Constant
0.130039
(4.38)***
0.139114
(5.98)***
0.078860
(1.41)
0.102760
(4.61)***
0.073670
(1.34)
F
R2 
0.56 0.49 0.59 0.81 0.80
N
65 65 57 65 57
Notes:
*** Statistically Significant at 1% Significance level
**  Statistically Significant at 5% Significance level
*   Statistically Significant at 10% Significance level
Table 5: Random-effects Model Dependent Variable THEIL Index
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In Table 5, using the random-effects on the panel regression data of inequality, the 
test results show that the variables of gross domestic savings, the GDP growth and the 
interaction variable between deposit interest and real interest are positively related to the 
level of inequality across all models. For example, in model 1, a one percent increase in the 
gross domestic savings will increase the level of inequality by 0.2 percent. The positive 
relationship between the level of inequality and the gross domestic savings is only 
statistically significant in model 1 at 5%. As for the positive relationship between the level of 
inequality and the interaction variable between deposit interest and real interest, it is 
statistically significant at 1% for models 2 and 4 and at 5% for model 5. As for models 1 and 
3, the interaction variable has no statistical significance. The coefficient of GDP growth 
shows no statistical significance across all models. 
 
Additionally, the data results show that the coefficient of GDP per capita and the 
interaction variable between oil rent and GDP growth are positively related to the level of 
inequality in models 4 and 5, but with different statistical significance. The GDP per Capita is 
statistically significant to the level of inequality in both models at 5%. However, the oil 
growth interaction variable has no statistical significance over inequality in both models. This 
statistical insignificance is also valid for the positive relationship that exists between the 
coefficient of the value added for manufacturing and the level of economic inequality in 
models 3 and 5.  
 
On the other hand, the panel regression data of inequality show that the variables of 
the real interest, oil rent and the number of out-of-school female children of primary school 
age are negatively related to the level of inequality across all models. For example, in model 
4, a one percent increase in the real interest will decrease the level of inequality by 0.3 
percent and a one percent increase in oil rent will decrease the level of inequality by 0.7%. 
The negative relationship between the level of inequality and the number of out-of-school 
female children of primary school age is statistically significant across all models at 1%, 
except for model 5 where it is statistically significant at 5%. In opposition to that is the 
negative relationship between the level of inequality and the real interest. The latter is 
statistically insignificant across all models, with the exception of model 4 in which it is 
statistically significant at 5%. As for the negative relationship between the level of inequality 
and the oil rent, it is only statistically significant in models 1 and 4 at 10%.  
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Additionally, the coefficient of the interaction variable between GDP growth and 
GDP per capita is negatively related to the level of inequality in model 4 at 10% statistical 
significance and at no statistical significance in model 5. A negative realtionship also exists 
between the level of inequality and trade in models 2, 3, 4 and 5, but it is not statistically 
significant at any model. 
 
The remaining two variables tested (i.e. the gross fixed capital formation and  the 
deposit interest) are positively related to the level of inequality in some models and 
negatively related to it in other models. The coefficient of the gross fixed capital formation is 
positive in model 4 at 5% statistical significance whereas it is positive and insignificant in 
model 5. This same variable's coefficient is negative across all the remaining models (model 
1 through 3) at no statistical significance. As for the coefficient of the deposit interest, it is 
negatively related to the level of inequality in models 1 through 4 with no statistical 
significance except  for model 1 in which the coefficient is statistically  significant at 5%. 
The deposit interest coefficient is insignificant statistically and positively related to the 
inequality level in model 5. 
 
Also, the R Square for all the models ranges from 49 to 81 percent which indicates 
that the chosen variables in our research provide a reasonably good fit to explain the 
dependent variable of inequality. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This thesis aimed to investigate the effect of the capital formation and the capital rate 
of returns on the economic inequality in MENA region while controlling other factors of 
economic growth and socio-economic conditions.   
The research results have shown that factors of capital formation such as GDS and 
GFCAPC are positively related to economic inequality. So, the increases in GDS and 
GFCAPC will cause a h of wealth and inheritance increases inequality.  
 
On the other hand, the results showed that the capital rate of returns such as the real 
interest, the deposit interest, Oil  rents and out-of-school female primary children  are 
negatively  related to economic inequality. When the deposit interest rate or the oil rents 
increase, the economic inequality decreases.This contradicts Piketty's theory and the 
literature claiming that the higher rate of return on capital and wealth increases the economic 
inequality. It also defeats the literature debate on the curse of having abundant natural 
resources, especially oil in MENA countries. The debate accuses the huge revenues coming 
from the oil sector of slowering the economic growth since the other economic sectors will 
not be as competitive as the oil sector within the region's context of resources 
mismanagement and high corruption. 
 
The empirical results presented above should have important implications on 
formulating and conducting macro-economic policies and development strategies in this 
region. This is to control capital formation and wealth accumulation to curtail inequality and 
treat it as a priority to eradicate poverty. 
 
This research is an addition to the limited research on economic inequality in the 
MENA region. However, the missing and un-reliable data available for the MENA countries 
was considered a challenge to the study by reducing the number of observations in the 
regression models. Hence, this represents a good area to be explored by researchers and data 
collectors and it is suggested for extensive data collection and research in the near future to 
be used as a further analysis for the measures and effects of the different variables on 
economic inequality. Thus, it will allow policy makers and government officials design and 
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implement programs to decrease the effect of capital accumulation on increasing the 
economic inequality while maintaining sustainable growth in the region. 
When the data collection's shortcoming is covered, it will be up to policy makers to 
develop comprehensive strategies for inclusive development and better wealth distribution to 
tackle inequality. Revised fiscal and monetary policies to reform tax and benefits are needed 
to increase fair and redistributive effects and avoid the effect of wealth and power 
accumulation.  
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